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“CATEGORICALLY UNSAFE” TO DONATE
Marielle Forrest*
Abstract
Plasma donation centers routinely adopt policies that preclude
individuals with mental illnesses from donating blood plasma. While
plasma donation centers assert that their policies are motivated by
employee and customer safety, such safety concerns are unsubstantiated.
These policies are based on speculation and stereotypes, rather than
scientific evidence. But discrimination against people with mental illness
is only unlawful if perpetrated by an entity subject to the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and circuit courts are split on whether blood
plasma donation centers fall within the ADA’s parameters. In 2016, the
Tenth Circuit held that blood plasma donation centers are “service
establishments” under Title III of the ADA but, two years later, the Fifth
Circuit held the opposite. In 2019, the Third Circuit weighed in, agreeing
with the Tenth Circuit.
This Note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s holding is unpersuasive, and
that blood plasma donation centers should constitute “service
establishments” under the ADA. Accordingly, this Note argues for the
finding that, when blood plasma donation centers discriminate against
individuals with mental illness, the centers are violating the ADA. This
Note begins with a discussion of blood plasma donation facilities and the
ADA. Next, it summarizes the three Circuit Court cases in question. This
Note then proposes three reasons why plasma donation centers are ADA
“service establishments”: first, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), an
agency tasked with enforcing the ADA, itself interprets “service
establishments” as including plasma donation centers, and the DOJ’s
interpretation warrants deference; second, the Fifth Circuit did not
adequately respond to the plaintiff’s statutory purpose argument; third,
for compelling policy reasons, courts should be motivated to find that
plasma collection centers are “service establishments,” namely, to
diminish public stigma and the harmful effects that flow therefrom, and to
show those with mental illnesses the respect and dignity that they are
owed.

*
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I. INTRODUCTION
Plasma donation centers routinely adopt, under the guise of safety, policies that
preclude certain individuals with mental illnesses from donating blood plasma.1
These policies have the potential to deter one in five adults from making plasma
donations.2 This prospect is particularly shocking in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, where blood plasma donation has become an important source of income
for many people,3 as well as a key aspect of COVID-19 therapy research.4 Plasma
donation centers obstruct these ends through discrimination. While plasma donation
centers assert that their policies are motivated by employee and customer safety,5
these safety concerns are unsubstantiated. Indeed, “[n]o medical justification or
other scientific evidence undergirds” plasma donation centers’ “implicit conclusion”
that all who have a particular mental illness, such as severe anxiety or schizophrenia,
“will put staff, other donors, or themselves at risk when donating plasma.”6 These
policies, rather, are “based on speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations.”7
The problem is that it is not inherently unlawful for plasma donation centers to
discriminate against people with mental illnesses. Discrimination against those with
mental illnesses is only unlawful if perpetrated by an entity subject to the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)—and circuit courts have split on whether blood
plasma donation centers fall within the ADA’s parameters.8 First, in 2016, the Tenth
Circuit, in Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., held that blood plasma donation
centers are “service establishments” under Title III of the ADA.9 Then, in 2018, the
Fifth Circuit, in Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., held that blood plasma donation
1

See, e.g., Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d 323, 326–27 (5th Cir. 2018); Matheis
v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2019); Levorsen v. Octapharma, Inc.,
828 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 2016).
2
Mental Health by the Numbers, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
https://www.nami.org/mhstats [https://perma.cc/5XFW-CNUY] (last updated Mar. 2021).
3
See, e.g., Grace Juarez, Plasma Donations Act as Supplemental Income for Some
During COVID-19 Pandemic, LUFKIN DAILY NEWS (May 12, 2020), https://lufkindailynews.
com/coronavirus/article_0ce734b2-60cd-5428-bc5e-18708ac846d5.html [https://perma.cc/
5M8C-B5YM] (“In the midst of a pandemic where money is increasingly tight for some
families, people are turning to alternative methods of income like donating plasma.”).
4
See, e.g., AABB COVID-19 Resources, AM. ASS’N OF BLOOD BANKS,
https://www.aabb.org/regulatory-and-advocacy/regulatory-affairs/infectious-diseases/
coronavirus [https://perma.cc/ZY5U-BYZT] (last visited June 13, 2021) (“Convalescent
plasma has a long history of helping to reduce the severity of infectious disease outbreaks.
Data from clinical trials conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic suggest that, when
administered early in the course of COVID-19 infection, CCP may help reduce the length
and severity of illness in some patients.”).
5
See, e.g., Silguero, 907 F.3d at 327; Matheis, 936 F.3d at 180.
6
Matheis, 936 F.3d at 181.
7
Id.
8
See generally Levorsen v. Octapharma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2016); Silguero,
907 F.3d 323.
9
828 F.3d at 1234.
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centers are not Title III “service establishments.”10 Finally, in 2019, the Third
Circuit, in Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., agreed with the Tenth Circuit.11 (In February
2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari from the Fifth Circuit’s Silguero v. CSL
Plasma, Inc.).12
This Note will analyze this circuit split. Part II of this Note gives background
on blood plasma donation facilities and the ADA. Part III reviews the Tenth, Fifth,
and Third Circuit Court cases, the various judicial interpretations of “service
establishments,” and the circuit courts’ respective holdings. Part IV argues that the
Fifth Circuit’s holding is unpersuasive and that blood plasma donation centers
should constitute “service establishments” under the ADA. Part IV reaches this
conclusion in light of the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ’s”) interpretation of
“service establishments” and the deference owed therein, the Fifth Circuit’s
inadequate response to the plaintiff’s statutory purpose argument, and the multitude
of policy reasons that should motivate courts to find that plasma collection centers
are “service establishments.”
II. BLOOD PLASMA DONATION CENTERS, THE ADA, AND “SERVICE
ESTABLISHMENTS”
Circuit courts are split on whether blood plasma donation centers fall within the
ADA’s Title III “service establishment” parameters. Understanding these
conflicting rulings requires first, understanding how blood plasma donation centers
operate, and second, understanding the ADA and its Title III “service
establishments.”
A. CSL Plasma and Octapharma Donation Centers
Two plasma donation companies, Octapharma Plasma, Inc. and CSL Plasma,
Inc., were defendants in the circuit split. Octapharma is a U.S.-based company that
operates over eighty plasma donation centers in thirty-four states.13 CSL Plasma
operates “one of the world’s largest . . . plasma collection networks, with more than
270 plasma collection centers in U.S., Europe and China . . . .”14

10

907 F.3d at 332.
936 F.3d 171.
12
140 S. Ct. 1107, 1108 (2020) (mem.).
13
Donation Centers, OCTAPHARMA PLASMA, https://octapharmaplasma.com/donor/
donation-centers [https://perma.cc/QT22-XUUC] (last visited June 5, 2021); About OPI,
OCTAPHARMA PLASMA https://octapharmaplasma.com/about [https://perma.cc/YN997VXX] (last visited June 5, 2021).
14
About CSL Plamsa, CSL PLASMA, https://www.cslplasma.com/about-csl-plasma
[https://perma.cc/KD5Q-RAFU] (last visited June 5, 2021).
11
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At Octapharma and CSL Plasma facilities, employees collect plasma from
donors using a process called plasmapheresis.15 During the process, staff members
draw and process each donor’s blood, “separating and reserving the plasma before
returning the red blood cells to the donor.”16 Octapharma and CSL Plasma sell the
collected plasma to pharmaceutical companies, who use it to create “life-saving
medicines that treat patients with rare, chronic, and inherited diseases[.]”17 The
plasma is also used in “emergency medicine or trauma, for bleeding disorders like
hemophilia, and to treat patients whose bodies have trouble fighting infections
because of immune diseases.”18 Octapharma and CSL Plasma compensate donors
for their plasma with money.19
In general, donating plasma is an intense process that can take up to two hours.20
Importantly, to be eligible to donate plasma, prospective donors must pass “an
individualized screening process.”21 “Those who do not pass the screening, for
whatever reason, are deferred—told they will not be permitted to donate and will
not be paid.”22 To be eligible to donate, the individual must meet the Food and Drug
Administration’s (“FDA’s”) regulations for donor eligibility.23 The FDA’s
regulations state that a donor is not eligible to donate plasma if (A) “the donor is not
in good health” or (B) the plasma donation center identifies “any factor(s) that may
cause the donation to adversely affect: (1) The health of the donor; or (2) The safety,
purity, or potency of the blood or blood component.”24

15

Octapharma’s website describes the process: “A trained staff member called a
phlebotomist puts a sterile needle in your arm vein to draw blood. The blood is then cycled
through special, sterile equipment that separates plasma from the other parts of your blood.
Your plasma is then collected in a container, while the other parts are safely returned to your
body.” Plasma Donation FAQs, OCTAPHARMA PLASMA, https://octapharmaplasma.com/
donor/plasma-donation-faq [https://perma.cc/K7UQ-JKEM] (last visited June 5, 2021). CSL
Plasma uses the same process. See Your First Donation, CSL PLASMA,
https://www.cslplasma.com/become-a-donor/your-first-donation [https://perma.cc/M2BMH53X] (last visited June 5, 2021) (“We collect your plasma using a special process called
plasmapheresis that separates the plasma from the blood and collects it in a bottle.”).
16
Levorsen v. Octapharma, 828 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Your First
Donation, supra note 15 (“We use a sophisticated high-tech machine that safely collects the
plasma and returns the other parts of the blood back to you . . . .”).
17
Your First Donation, supra note 15; Plasma Donation FAQs, supra note 15; see also
Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting that CSL Plasma
transports plasma “to be made into medicines”).
18
Plasma Donation FAQs, supra note 15.
19
See id. (“New Donors can make up to $250 for their first five plasma
donations . . . .”); Your First Donation, supra note 15 (noting that donors can earn up to
$1,100 during their first month donating plasma).
20
Matheis, 936 F.3d at 174–75; Plasma Donation FAQs, supra note 15.
21
Matheis, 936 F.3d at 175.
22
Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 2018).
23
Id.; Levorsen v. Octapharma, 828 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016).
24
21 C.F.R. § 630.10(a) (2020).
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More specifically, under FDA regulations, plasma donation centers must check
a prospective donor’s temperature,25 blood pressure,26 hemoglobin level,27 pulse,28
weight,29 and skin condition.30 Moreover, pursuant to a general safety provision,
plasma donation centers may take steps it deems necessary to ensure the health of
the donor and the “safety, purity, or potency” of the plasma.31 For instance, plasma
donation centers may consider an individual’s medications, vaccinations, and preexisting medical conditions.32 It is also from this general safety provision that
Octapharma and CSL Plasma created the company policies at issue in this Note.33
B. The ADA and Title III “Service Establishments”
In July 1990, Congress passed the ADA in response to its observation that
“historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities” and that this “continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social
problem.”34 In enacting the ADA, Congress intended to “provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with [physical and mental] disabilities.”35 Accordingly, the ADA is far25
Id. § 630.10(f)(1) (“The donor’s oral body temperature must not exceed 37.5 °C
(99.5 °F), or the equivalent if measured at another body site.”).
26
Id. § 630.10(f)(2) (“The donor’s systolic blood pressure must not measure above 180
mm of mercury, or below 90 mm of mercury, and the diastolic blood pressure must not
measure above 100 mm of mercury or below 50 mms of mercury.”).
27
Id. § 630.10(f)(3) (“You must determine the donor’s hemoglobin level or hematocrit
value by using a sample of blood obtained by fingerstick, venipuncture, or by a method that
provides equivalent results.”).
28
Id. § 630.10(f)(4) (“The donor’s pulse must be regular and between 50 and 100 beats
per minute.”).
29
Id. § 630.10(f)(5) (“The donor must weigh a minimum of 50 kilograms (110
pounds).”).
30
Id. § 630.10(f)(6) (“(i) The donor’s phlebotomy site must be free of infection,
inflammation, and lesions; and (ii) The donor’s arms and forearms must be free of punctures
and scars indicative of injected drugs of abuse.”).
31
Id. § 630.10(a).
32
Donor Information, First-Time Donors, OCTAPHARMA PLASMA, https://octapharma
plasma.com/donor/first-time-donors [https://perma.cc/WKZ5-R77Z] (last visited June 5,
2021).
33
CSL Plasma considers its policy to defer individuals who require service animals to
treat their anxiety as a “safety requirement.” Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d 323,
327 (5th Cir. 2018). Moreover, CSL’s policy to defer donors “who use multiple anxiety
medications . . . is a safety rule . . . .” Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 180 (3rd
Cir. 2019). Finally, Octapharma’s decision to defer an individual with schizophrenia was out
of a concern for safety because the establishment feared that the prospective donor “might
have a schizophrenic episode while donating and dislodge the collecting needle, possibly
injuring himself or someone else.” Levorsen v. Octapharma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th
Cir. 2016).
34
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2012).
35
Id. § 12101(b)(1).
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reaching, prohibiting discrimination on many different fronts, from workplaces and
public services to public accommodations.36 The Supreme Court has described the
ADA as “‘a milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive
society . . . .’”37
But, while the ADA may be comprehensive on its face, those with mental
illnesses are often unprotected.38 Indeed, some argue that there is a “near-total failure
of the ADA to protect individuals with psychiatric disabilities . . . .”39 This failure
arises, to some extent, from the ADA’s nebulous language.40 For instance, the
ADA’s protections are triggered, in relevant part, when “any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation” discriminates
against an individual “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation . . . .”41 The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of
such individual.”42 But the ADA never defines what constitutes a “mental
impairment,” what it means to “substantially” limit major life activities, or which
“life activities” are considered “major.”43
36

Id. § Ch. 126.
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001) (quoting Board of Trustees of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
38
See, e.g., Susan Stefan, You’d Have to Be Crazy to Work Here: Worker Stress, the
Abusive Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 802–03 (1998)
(“Plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities almost always lose ADA discrimination cases,
despite EEOC regulations and guidance requiring employers to adjust supervisory methods,
or permit employees to work fewer hours, or work different shifts if feasible. This is because
courts reflexively assume that conditions which preclude people with psychiatric disabilities
from being successful are necessary elements of the workplace. While courts understand that
accessible workplaces may require teletypewriters or ramps, and that neither sexual
harassment nor race discrimination is an employer prerogative, stress, punishing hours,
overwork, unpleasant personality conflicts, and even worker abuse are much more
commonly seen as simply intrinsic features of the workplace.”); Kathleen D. Zylan,
Legislation That Drives Us Crazy: An Overview of “Mental Disability” Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 79, 120–21 (2000) (“A quick survey of
the case law demonstrates that the ADA lacks the necessary specificity to provide the ‘clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
(mental) disabilities’ that the statute was enacted to provide.”).
39
Stefan, supra note 38, at 805.
40
Zylan, supra note 38, at 80.
41
42 U.S.C. § 12182 (emphasis added).
42
Id. § 12102(1)(A) (emphasis added).
43
While the ADA lists a handful of activities that constitute “major life activities” (e.g.,
“caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, . . .
speaking, breathing, learning, . . . thinking, communicating,” working, and performing major
bodily functions), this list is non-exclusive (the definition states that “major life activities
include, but are not limited to . . .”). Id. § 12102(2). Thus, ambiguity arises for other activities
that litigants argue are major life activities, despite lacking an explicit reference in the
statute’s definition.
37
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Courts are tasked with interpreting the ADA’s ambiguities. Unfortunately,
judicial discretion frequently results in holdings that fail to recognize the nature of
mental illness. Courts have held, for example, that documentation from physicians
(as opposed to psychiatrists) is insufficient to demonstrate a psychiatric impairment,
that post-traumatic stress disorder is not “substantial” enough to be covered under
the ADA, and that interacting with others is not a “major life activity”—discounting
the difficulties that often come with major depression and anxiety.44
In the context of blood plasma donation centers, courts do not reach the
question of what constitutes a “disability” under the ADA. Before approaching the
ambiguities found in that definition, courts must first decide a separate point of
contention––whether blood plasma donation centers are considered public
accommodations under ADA Title III. Title III defines “public accommodations” as
places of: lodging, food and drink, “exhibition or entertainment” (e.g., movie
theaters, stadiums), public gatherings (e.g., auditoriums, convention centers, lecture
halls), sales and rentals (e.g., grocery stores, clothing stores, shopping centers),
public transportation, public display or collection (e.g., a museum), recreation,
education, social services (e.g., daycare centers, homeless shelters), exercise, and
places that constitute “service establishment[s].”45 Title III goes on to define a
“service establishment” as “a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty
shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an
accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health
care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.”46
Because Title III’s list of “service establishments” is non-exclusive,47 and
because Title III does not expressly define “service establishment,” it is up to the
courts to interpret what other establishments, in addition to those enumerated,
constitute “service establishments.” This Note will address whether blood plasma
donation centers constitute “service establishments.”
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: IS PLASMA COLLECTION A “SERVICE”?
While some contend that plasma donation centers fall within Title III’s “other
service establishment” catchall,48 the centers themselves argue that they fall outside
of it and, consequently, outside of the ADA.49 In effect, it is up to the courts to decide
whether plasma donation centers are considered service establishments and, if so,
whether service establishments can discriminate against people based on mental
illness. In the Tenth and Third Circuits, plasma donation centers are considered
service establishments and are subject to ADA provisions. In the Fifth Circuit,
44

Zylan, supra note 38, at 90–99.
Id. § 12181(7).
46
Id. § 12181(7)(F) (emphasis added).
47
See infra Section III.C.
48
See Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 2016);
Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 2019); Silguero v. CSL Plasma,
Inc., 907 F.3d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2018).
49
See, e.g., Levorsen, 828 F.3d at 1229–30.
45
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plasma donation centers fall outside Title III’s catchall. Depending on which circuit
court is correct, plasma donation centers may or may not be barred from
discriminating against potential donors’ mental illnesses. This Part reviews the (A)
Tenth, (B) Fifth, and (C) Third Circuit cases, as well as the judicial interpretations
of “service establishments,” and the circuit courts’ respective holdings.
A. The Tenth Circuit: Blood Plasma Donation Centers Are “Service
Establishments”
In the Tenth Circuit case of Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc.,50 the court
held that blood plasma donation centers are service establishments and, accordingly,
must comply with the ADA.51 In Levorsen, a blood plasma donation center
(Octapharma) denied a man (Levorsen) the opportunity to donate blood plasma
because of his mental illness.52 Levorsen, who suffered from “various psychiatric
disorders, including borderline schizophrenia,”53 had, for years, donated plasma “to
supplement his limited income.”54
In May of 2013, Levorsen went to donate plasma at a branch of Octapharma
located in Salt Lake City.55 After learning that Levorsen suffered from borderline
schizophrenia, the staff at Octapharma deemed Levorsen ineligible to donate plasma
because they were concerned that Levorsen might have a schizophrenic episode and
“dislodge the collecting needle, possibly injuring himself or someone else.”56 The
fact that Levorsen had donated plasma in the past was irrelevant.57 Levorsen went
so far as to present documentation signed by his psychiatrists, indicating that he was
“medically suitable to donate plasma twice a week.”58 The psychiatrists’ approval,
vouching for Levorsen’s fitness, made no difference—Octapharma still barred
Levorsen from donating.59
The district court, narrowly construing “service establishments” under the
ADA, held that Octapharma, as a blood plasma donation center, did not fall within
the scope of the statute.60 Levorsen appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit, and
the Tenth Circuit granted de novo review.61
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, construing Title III
broadly and ruling in favor of Levorsen. The court began its analysis by stating that
courts are obliged to “construe [the ADA’s provisions] liberally to afford individuals
50

Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1234.
52
Id. at 1229–30.
53
Id. at 1229.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1229–30.
60
Id. at 1236.
61
Id. at 1230–31.
51
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with disabilities access to the same establishments available to those without
disabilities.”62 With this frame of reference, the court examined the scope of service
establishments to see if it included blood plasma donation centers.
The Tenth Circuit arrived at an unambiguous definition of “service
establishment,” “begin[ning] and end[ing] with the plain meaning of the words that
Congress employed.”63 According to the terms’ dictionary definitions, “[a]n
establishment is a ‘place of business’ or ‘a public or private institution ([such] as a
school or hospital)” and “a service is ‘conduct or performance that assists or benefits
someone or something,’ or ‘useful labor that does not produce a tangible
commodity.’”64 From this, the court combined the terms’ definitions and concluded
that a service establishment is “a place of business or a public or private institution
that, by its conduct or performance, assists or benefits someone or something or
provides useful labor without producing a tangible good for a customer or client.”65
This ordinary meaning, the court found, “yields a broad definition that is
entirely consistent with Title III’s” objective to promote the same opportunities for
all individuals, regardless of disability.66 Because plasma donation centers are places
of business that “‘assist[] or benefit[]’” plasma donors by supplying them with
trained personnel and medical equipment, blood plasma donation centers constitute
service establishments.67 Whether a donor is motivated by “altruistic reasons or for
pecuniary gain” is irrelevant.68
While the court found that the plain meaning of “service establishment”
included blood plasma donation centers, the court went on to consider ejusdem
generis and noscitur a sociis,69 canons that Octapharma argued indicate that blood
plasma donation centers are beyond the scope of a “service establishment.”70 The
court arrived at the opposite conclusion.71
The court conceded that “because—unlike [Title III’s] enumerated examples
[of “service establishments”]—[plasma donation centers] provide compensation to,
rather than accept compensation from, their customers,” both ejusdem generis and
noscitur a sociis indicate plasma donation centers should not be treated as service
establishments. However, citing Tenth Circuit precedent, the court states that
“another rule of statutory interpretation counsels against reading such a directionof-compensation requirement into the statute when one doesn’t appear there.” The
62

Id. at 1230 (citing PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001)).
Id. at 1232.
64
Id. at 1231 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002)).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1232.
67
Id. at 1234.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1231 (“These canons counsel, respectively, that (1) ‘when a general term
follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin
to the one with specific enumeration,’ and (2) ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’”
(citations omitted)).
70
Id. at 1232–33.
71
Id. at 1233.
63

452

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

court “must ‘ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not
appear on its face.’”72 Thus, in these circumstances, the canons do not “clarify
matters” but instead “manufacture ambiguity where none exists.”73 The court turned
to the legislative history to settle the matter.
The Tenth Circuit found that the legislative history bolsters the court’s
interpretation, noting two key historical points: first, a house committee report
explained that an entity need not be similar to the examples listed in an ADA
definition to constitute an ADA entity; instead, the entity need only to “fall[] within
the overall category.”74 Second, and most notable, “Congress changed the language
in § 12181(7)(F) from ‘other similar service establishments’ to ‘other service
establishments,’ presumably to make clear that a particular business need not be
similar to the enumerated examples to constitute a service establishment.”75 In short,
the legislative history confirmed that ADA service establishments do not need to
“provide or accept compensation as part of that process.”76 The “interpretative
gymnastics” that Octapharma asked the court to adopt were, thus, “unnecessary” and
“inappropriate.”77 Blood plasma donation centers fall squarely within the scope of
the ADA.78
In a dissenting opinion similar in kind to the majority opinion later adopted by
the Fifth Circuit, Judge Holmes wrote: “a plasma-donation center is not a ‘service
establishment’ within the meaning of § 12181(7)(F).”79 While Judge Holmes’s
analysis, much like the majority’s, “rest[ed] squarely on the plain terms of the
statute,”80 Judge Holmes adopted a different methodology in applying the plain
meaning.81 According to Judge Holmes, “service establishment” is a term of art with
“a meaning quite distinct from the dictionary definitions of its component words.”82
Relying merely on the ordinary meaning, as the majority does, was insufficient to
Judge Holmes.83
Judge Holmes argued that the court must consider canons of construction
alongside the ordinary meaning, as “aids in construing the language itself—not tools
to be relied on only in the face of ambiguity.”84 In other words, canons of
construction are “part and parcel” of, and not a subsequent step in, the plain meaning
analysis.85 Using these canons of construction to reach the plain meaning of “service
72

Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1233.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1233–34.
77
Id. at 1238 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
78
Id. at 1229 (majority opinion).
79
Id. at 1235 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
80
Id. at 1244.
81
Id. at 1236–38.
82
Id. at 1241.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1238.
73
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establishment,” Judge Holmes found three “key unifying traits” of “every service
establishment listed in § 12181(7)(F)”:
They offer the public a “service” (1) in the form of (a) expertise (e.g.,
barbers, beauticians, shoe-repair craftsman, dry cleaners, funeral parlors,
lawyers, accountants, insurance offices, pharmacists, health care
providers, and hospitals) or (b) specialized equipment (e.g., laundromats
and gas stations), (2) for use in achieving some desired end, [86] (3) in
exchange for monetary compensation.87
While plasma donation centers offer public expertise and specialized equipment,
they are unlike the enumerated service establishments because they do not “receive
a fee from members of the public in exchange for any services that they provide” or
provide services “for the public’s use in achieving a desired end.”88
According to Judge Holmes, blood plasma donation centers “resemble
manufacturers much more than they do” public service establishments.89 Judge
Holmes stated that blood plasma donation centers “manufacture a product: plasma.
They derive this product from a raw commodity—i.e., whole blood—that donors
provide in exchange for a fee.”90 Indeed—Judge Holmes argued—both Congress
and the FDA view plasma donation centers as manufacturers. In regulating
biological products, Congress requires “each package of a biological product be
marked with the identity ‘of the manufacturer of the biological product.’”91
Moreover, FDA regulations state that “‘[a]ll steps in the manufacturing of Source
Plasma . . . shall be performed by personnel of the establishment licensed to
manufacture Source Plasma . . .’” and that “‘licensed manufacturer[s] of blood and
blood components, including Source Plasma’” must complete an FDA form.92 Judge
Holmes concluded that the “Octapharma-Levorsen scenario is patently at odds with
the service-establishment paradigm” that the ADA “envisions,”93 and that plasma
donation centers “do not fall within the scope of” the ADA.94
86

See id. at 1240 (noting examples of such a desired end include a haircut, clean clothes,
and legal advice).
87
Id. at 1241.
88
Id. at 1235–36. “[T]o the extent that plasma-donation centers provide services to the
public—such as those services identified by Mr. Levorsen and the United States—they do
not do so for the public’s use in achieving a desired end; instead, they provide them for the
centers’ use in achieving a desired end. More specifically, plasma-donation centers provide
the public with the expertise associated with blood screening and the specialized equipment
necessary to collect plasma so that the centers can sell the plasma to their customers in the
pharmaceutical industry (i.e., the desired end)—not so that they can assist the public to
achieve some desired end.” Id. at 1243.
89
Id. at 1244.
90
Id. at 1235–36.
91
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1)(B)(ii)).
92
Id. at 1244 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 640.71(a), 606.171(a)) (emphasis added).
93
Id. at 1243.
94
Id. at 1236.
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B. The Fifth Circuit: Blood Plasma Donation Centers Are Not “Service
Establishments”
A little over two years after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Levorsen, a plaintiff
appealed a similar case to the Fifth Circuit in Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc.95 In
Silguero, the court held that blood plasma donation centers do not fall within the
scope of service establishments and thus need not comply with the ADA.96
Alleging an ADA violation, the plaintiff (Wolfe) brought suit against CSL
Plasma donation center (CSL).97 Based on Wolfe’s anxiety disorder requiring the
regular use of a service dog,98 CSL found Wolfe ineligible to donate plasma. CSL
cited company policy “not to accept donors whose anxiety [is] severe enough to
require the use of a service animal.”99 CSL contended that its decision was based on
“legitimate safety requirement[s].”100
The district court granted summary judgment for CSL, concluding that the
ADA did not apply to CSL because CSL was not a “public accommodation.”101
Wolfe appealed the court’s grant of summary judgment to the Fifth Circuit, and the
Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo.102
Similar to the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by examining
the plain meaning of Title III.103 The threshold question, according to the Fifth
Circuit, rested on the term “service” and, specifically, “whether CSL Plasma
provides ‘services’ to others.”104 The Fifth Circuit determined that the “word
‘service’ generally denotes some ‘helpful act’ or an ‘act giving assistance or
advantage to another.’”105 Thus, the court stated, “Congress’s use of the word
‘service’ . . . [i]n the case of a ‘service establishment’” suggests that “the
establishment serves the members of the public who are ‘helped’ or ‘benefited’ by
the service.”106 While the Fifth Circuit’s definition of service establishment is
“materially similar to the one developed by the Tenth Circuit,”107 the Fifth Circuit
95

907 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2018). This case involved a second plaintiff, Silguero.
Silguero’s circumstances lie beyond the scope of this Note. CSL deferred Silguero from
donating plasma “based on CSL Plasma’s policy not to accept donors who have an ‘unsteady
gait.’” Id. at 326. Silguero “has bad knees and requires the use of a cane to walk.” Id. Though
undoubtedly a travesty against the fair treatment of individuals with disabilities, Silguero’s
case will not be considered here because this Note’s focus is on mental illnesses rather than
disability broadly.
96
See id. at 332.
97
Id. at 325.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 326.
100
Id. at 327.
101
Id. at 325.
102
Id. at 327.
103
Id. at 331–32.
104
Id. at 328.
105
Id.
106
Id. (emphasis added).
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Id.
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ultimately reached the opposite conclusion. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the
Tenth Circuit’s holding for three reasons.
First, under a plain meaning interpretation, “the word ‘service’ implies that the
customer is benefitted by the act.”108 The Fifth Circuit found that “no such benefit
occurs” from donating plasma.109 Instead, donors are the ones performing a service
for the establishment; donors are “hooked up to a machine[,] drained of lifesustaining fluid,” and subjected “to discomfort and medical risks.”110 Nor do donors
have a say over what happens to the plasma—the “labor is not ‘useful’ to the donor;
it is ‘useful’ to the establishment.”111 The Fifth Circuit depicted the act of donating
as one of great burden to the donor, while the donation center is the beneficiary.
Second, and relatedly, the court emphasized that, pursuant to the canon of
ejusdem generis, “a catchall phrase should be read in light of the preceding
list . . . .”112 In applying this canon, the court noted that plasma donation centers
would fit “oddly” within the listed establishments in Title III.113 As mentioned, all
the listed establishments offer “a detectable benefit to the customer.”114 The court
explained that “Dry-cleaners press customers’ shirts. Lawyers file clients’ pleadings.
Hospitals mend patients’ broken bones.”115 While service establishments perform
actions that directly benefit customers, clients, and patients, the court again stressed
that “plasma collection does not provide any detectable benefit for donors.”116 Thus,
plasma collection does not fit appropriately among the listed service establishments.
Third, and also related to the first two reasons, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that
it is atypical for service establishments to pay customers; rather, it is the customer
that pays the establishment for some benefit received.117 The court distinguished
plasma donation centers from service establishments by giving weight to this
opposite direction of compensation.118 The court found that the structure of plasma
donation centers “is more akin to employment or contract work,” which is governed
by Title I (and would therein be excluded, as Title I does not protect small businesses
or independent contractors).119 The court again emphasized that interpreting the
business of plasma donation and collection as something different would leave
“Title I largely redundant.”120
Wolfe pushed back on the court’s first rationale, that is, the idea that plasma
donation centers do not offer a benefit to the donor. Wolfe argued that there are both
108

Id. at 329.
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
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Id.
113
Id. at 330.
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Id. at 329.
115
Id. at 329–30.
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Id. at 330–31.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 331.
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tangible and abstract ways that donating plasma benefits donors. First, donors
tangibly benefit from donating plasma insofar as donors are compensated with
money payments.121 The court dismissed this benefit by noting that “the payment of
money” is a benefit “wholly collateral to the act of plasma collection.”122 The court
explained that a financial benefit counts as a benefit only when it is an “intrinsic
result of the act [performed] to serve the customer,” such as when banks pay
customers interest.123 Because the financial benefit associated with plasma donation
is not intrinsic to the service, the court does not consider it a detectable benefit.
Undeterred, Wolfe pointed to a more abstract way that donating plasma benefits
donors. That is, by enabling donors “to ‘realize’ the ‘commercial value’ of their
plasma, which they could not otherwise do without CSL Plasma.”124 The court
rejected this argument too. According to the court, Wolfe’s argument demanded an
interpretation that “would turn virtually every employer and entrepreneur into a
‘service establishment,’”125 “eviscerate[ing]” Title I of the ADA.126 Title I narrowly
governs “employment relationships,” and the court did not want to carve out a way
for plaintiffs to “dodge the narrowing scope127 of Title I and sue under Title III.”128
Wolfe next targeted the court’s second and third rationales for concluding that
plasma donation centers do not provide a “service.” Wolfe argued that blood
collection fits within the statute’s list because another establishment on the list itself
operates by an opposite direction of compensation.129 Namely, Wolfe argued that
banks perform for customers certain services free of charge and pay customers
interest on savings.130 Like plasma donors, customers of banks receive money while
the establishment does not. But the court found the analogy inadequate, noting that
“[a]ny payment customers receive [from banking] is not a result of the customer’s
labor but is instead an intrinsic result of the act the bank performs to serve the
customer.”131 The court continued:
121

Id. at 329.
Id.
123
Id. at 330.
124
Id. at 331.
125
Id. (“After all, a small restaurant enables cooks to ‘realize’ the ‘commercial value’
of their skills by providing a location for hungry people to come. A construction general
contractor enables construction independent contractors to ‘realize’ the ‘commercial value’
of their machinery by connecting them with clients in need.”).
126
Id.
127
Id. (“Congress made specific legislative choices about how broadly Title I would
apply. For instance, Title I protects only ‘employees’ and extends only to employers hiring
a sufficient number of employees. Thus, courts have often determined that employees at
small businesses and independent contractors are not protected by Title I of the ADA. If we
interpret ‘service establishment’ in Title III so broadly that it includes employment and
employment-like relationships, we risk overrunning Congress’s legislative choices in Title
I.” (citations omitted)).
128
Id.
129
Id. at 330.
130
Id.
131
Id.
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Contrast that with plasma collection centers. After the donor expends his
time and resources donating plasma, the plasma belongs to the plasma
collection center. The plasma collection center does not manage or oversee
the plasma on behalf of the donor. Donors are therefore unlike bank
customers because they are not benefitted by the act the establishment
performs.132
After reaching its conclusion that plasma donation centers cannot, with a plain
language application, fit within “service establishments,” the Fifth Circuit used
legislative intent to bolster its position. The court noted that “[i]f Congress wanted
to cover all ‘establishments’ it could have done so [by] omitting the word ‘service’”
from Title III’s “service establishments.”133 Accordingly, the court held that plasma
donation centers need not abide by the ADA.
C. The Third Circuit: Blood Plasma Donation Centers Are ADA “Service
Establishments”
The Fifth Circuit held steadfast in reaching its conclusion that collecting blood
does not constitute a service, even if it required the court to do the very
“interpretative gymnastics” that the Tenth Circuit in Levorsen refused to do.134 In
June 2019, less than one year after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Silguero, the Third
Circuit addressed the same divisive question: do blood plasma donation centers
count as service establishments under Title III of the ADA? In Matheis v. CSL
Plasma, the Third Circuit held that “the Tenth Circuit got it right: the ADA applies
to plasma donation centers.”135
In Matheis, Plaintiff George Matheis suffered sporadic panic attacks and was
diagnosed with PTSD.136 Despite his diagnosis, Matheis “routinely and safely
donated plasma roughly 90 times in an 11-month period” with CSL, earning $250300 a month.137 Matheis later got a service dog to help cope with his PTSD.138 When
Matheis tried to donate plasma at CSL with his service dog, CSL found Matheis
ineligible.139 CSL barred Matheis on the grounds that he required a service animal
to manage his anxiety.140 CSL’s concern was “not related to any health concerns that
132

Id.
Id. at 329.
134
Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2016).
135
936 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2019).
136
Id. at 174–75. Matheis’s mental illness stems from his former service as a SWAT
officer. Id. at 175.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.; Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 723, 734 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (noting
that CSL barred Matheis from donating plasma out of concern that “the stress of donating or
the confined setting of the donation room [could induce] a panic attack during the donation
process”).
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dogs . . . pose; rather [CSL] concluded that using a service animal for anxiety means
that the donor’s condition is too severe to undergo safely the donation process.”141
The district court granted CSL’s motion for summary judgment.142 While the
district court ruled that CSL “is a public accommodation under the ADA,”143 it
ultimately found that CSL “did not unlawfully discriminate because it had a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing to allow Matheis to donate
plasma, a concern that he suffered severe anxiety.”144 “Matheis appeal[ed] the ruling,
while CSL cross-appeal[ed], contending it is not subject to the ADA at all.”145 The
Third Circuit reviewed de novo the grant of summary judgment.146
The Third Circuit began its analysis by recapping the Tenth and Fifth Circuits’
reasoning in Levorsen and Silguero.147 Finding the Fifth Circuit’s analysis flawed,
the Third Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit’s Levorsen holding.148 The Third Circuit
refuted all three of the Fifth Circuit’s textual inferences.149 First, where the Fifth
Circuit found that the word “service” requires a benefit to the customer and that
plasma donors do not receive such a benefit, the Third Circuit held that donors do in
fact benefit: “the record is unequivocal that . . . donors receive money, a clear benefit,
to donate plasma.”150 The Third Circuit did not address the Fifth Circuit’s concern
that, if monetary payment were construed as a benefit, then all employers would
become “service establishments,” blurring the line between Title III and Title I.
Apparently, the Third Circuit was not concerned with addressing this slippery slope.
Second, where the Fifth Circuit concluded, under the canon of ejusdem generis,
that plasma donation centers do not fit amidst the list of “service establishments,”
the Third Circuit found that plasma donation centers are similar to banks.151 Both
plasma donation centers and banks use “the fruits of its public-facing services for
subsequent profit”—a bank “invests, trades, or loans” money to third parties, and a
plasma donation center sells plasma to third parties.152 This subsequent or secondary
profit does not make an establishment “any less a service establishment with respect
to the public.”153 And, while the Fifth Circuit would argue that the subsequent profits
of investments are distinct from the subsequent profits of blood plasma, insofar as a
customer has tabs on the former and not the latter, the Third Circuit does not seem

141
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to find this minutia to be worthy grounds upon which to draw a distinction.154 The
Third Circuit was unpersuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s ejusdem generis argument and
accordingly held that blood plasma donation centers fit within the listed service
establishments.
Third, where the Fifth Circuit gave weight to the “direction of monetary
compensation” to distinguish a plasma donation center from a service establishment,
the Third Circuit found this distinction unconvincing.155 That is, the Third Circuit
did not find it alarming that customers receive money rather than spend it on a
service. This is because, as the Third Circuit interprets it, blood plasma donors
essentially are spending money insofar as they pay for the blood collection service
with valuable blood plasma. The Third Circuit noted that “[t]he value received by
the service provider and given by the customer is often money, but it need not be.
Money is one proxy for economic value, and economic value is fungible.”156
Importantly, other service establishments allow customers to pay for services
with “prox[ies] for economic value”—things other than money.157 Namely,
pawnshops and recycling centers—both of which constitute ADA service
establishments—provide customers a service for which customers pay with
economic value proxies: one’s possessions and one’s waste.158 “These examples
underscore a simple fact: providing services means providing something of
economic value to the public; it does not matter whether it is paid for with money or
something else of value.”159 In short, just because the customer-donor does not pay
for her benefit with money does not then mean that the customer-donor does not
receive a service. The Third Circuit concluded that there is no reason to “arbitrarily
narrow the scope of ‘service establishments’ to entities that receive compensation
from customers in the form of money.”160 Plasma donation’s inverted “direction of
monetary compensation” is in good company.
The Third Circuit held that “a plasma donation center is a service establishment
under the ADA” because it “offers a service to the public, the extracting of plasma
for money, with the plasma then used by the center in its business of supplying a
vital product to healthcare providers.”161

154

Though the Third Circuit does not address this point, the Third Circuit likely would
find it a means of narrowing that which need not be narrowed.
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Id. at 177–78.
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IV. PLASMA COLLECTION IS A “SERVICE”: WHY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT GOT IT
WRONG
The Fifth Circuit incorrectly held that blood plasma donation centers are not
Title III “service establishments.”162 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit did not
adequately consider the DOJ’s interpretation. Nor did the Fifth Circuit adequately
address Silguero’s statutory purpose argument. Finally, there is a multitude of policy
reasons for courts to interpret plasma collection as a service. Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit’s conclusion is unpersuasive.
A. The DOJ Agrees with the Tenth and Third Circuits
In an amicus curiae brief to the Silguero court, the DOJ argued that a plasma
donation center “is a ‘service establishment’ . . . under Title III of the ADA.”163
While the DOJ’s interpretation is not binding, it does warrant deference.164
1. The DOJ’s Interpretation
Like the Tenth Circuit in Levorsen, the DOJ started and ended its interpretation
with the plain meaning of “service establishment.”165 The DOJ argued that
“[d]ictionary definitions of ‘service’ easily encompass the act of taking people’s
blood plasma to use for medicines and treatments.”166 The DOJ stated:
If a person wishes to provide blood plasma for use in the production of
medical treatments, he or she will need help to do that. Blood plasma
centers, which act as intermediaries in a commercial transaction for blood
plasma between donors and pharmaceutical entities, supply that assistance
in the form of trained personnel and necessary medical equipment.
Without this helpful activity or assistance - that is, service - individuals
who wish to provide blood plasma for medical use would be unable to do
so.167
According to the DOJ, the Silguero district court erred in “incorrectly
appl[ying] principles of statutory construction” in a way that improperly narrowed
“the meaning of service establishment.”168 Specifically, the district court construed
a “service establishment” as a place that necessarily provides goods or services in
162

See supra Section III.B for a discussion of the statute’s ambiguity.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, at 5
[hereinafter Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae]; Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d
323 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-41206), 2018 WL 889624, at *8.
164
Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d 323, 327 n.9 (5th Cir. 2018).
165
Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 163, at *10–12.
166
Id. at *11.
167
Id.
168
Id. at *14.
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exchange for compensation, such that plasma donation centers fall outside service
establishments’ scope (because plasma donation centers operate “in reverse,”
“compensat[ing] donors for donating their plasma”).169 The DOJ noted, however,
that “[n]othing in the statutory text imposes ‘[this] direction-of-compensation
requirement,’ and while many commercial service establishments require payment
for services rendered, others do not.”170
The common trait between the listed service establishments, then, is “not the
receipt of compensation for services but, rather, that each commercial establishment
provides services by supplying expertise or equipment or both.”171 Plasma donation
centers, like hospitals and barber shops, provide customers with specialized
equipment.172 Where barbers provide customers with expertise by way of scissors
and razors, a plasma donation center provides donors with “the specialized
equipment needed to procure plasma (e.g., needles, tubing, apheresis machines) and
trained medical personnel to assess donor eligibility and operate the equipment.”173
Accordingly, plasma collection is a service.
The DOJ found further support for its conclusion in the facts that (1) “[m]any
state laws expressly define procurement of blood plasma as a service,”174 (2) plasma
donation centers refer to themselves as service providers;175 and (3) “[c]onstruing
‘service establishment’ to include a plasma donation center . . . is consistent with the
ADA’s purpose.”176
169

Id.
Id. (citations omitted). Here the DOJ, like the Tenth Circuit in Matheis, notes that
banks and recycling centers, both of which fall under Title III service establishments, do not
operate with the enumerated service establishments’ “purported common trait” of a direction
of compensation. Id. at *14–15.
171
Id. at *15.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at *12. The DOJ suggests that the way state law treats “blood plasma procurement
supports the conclusion that the term ‘service’ in Title III is naturally read to include plasma
collection.” Id. The DOJ cites Mississippi (a Fifth Circuit state, thus in tension with
Silguero’s holding), Alabama, California, Kansas, Nebraska, Utah, and Vermont. Id. at *12–
13.
175
Id. at *13. The DOJ notes that “the names of CSL Plasma’s competitors and
descriptions of their businesses confirm that procuring blood plasma is commonly
understood within that industry to be a rendition of a service.” Id. The Department of Justice
cites a blood plasma donation center called “BioLife Plasma Services,” which states on its
website that “part of its ‘vision’ is that ‘[e]very donor is recognized for his or her contribution
and given exceptional service.’” Id. The Department also notes a second organization,
“Immunotek,” which states that it facilitates opening, managing, and operating “plasma
donor centers as a service.” Id. at *13–14.
176
Id. at *16. Specifically, the DOJ cites Congress’s equal-access initiative, as set forth
in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001), and Congress’s intentional choice to
change the language of the ADA “to make it easier for individuals to establish that an entity
is covered by Title III.” Id. (citations omitted). See also supra Section III.A (discussing
170
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2. The DOJ’s Deference
Interestingly, while the DOJ filed its amicus curiae brief prior to the Third
Circuit decision in Matheis, and while the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion
as the DOJ, the Third Circuit did not rely on—or even explicitly cite to—the DOJ’s
brief. Still, the DOJ’s interpretation is important and warrants deference. The
question is what sort of deference the DOJ deserves.
Three types of deference could apply to the DOJ’s interpretation. The first,
“Chevron deference,” applies when Congress delegates authority to an
administrative agency to interpret an ambiguous statute through regulation.177 When
Chevron deference applies, an agency’s interpretation is often controlling; “a
reviewing court . . . [must] accept the agency’s position if Congress has not
previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable.”178 That said, Chevron deference does not apply when agencies “assert
their statutory interpretations solely through litigation briefs.”179 The second type of
deference, “Auer deference,” applies when an agency reasonably interprets its own
“genuinely ambiguous” regulation, so long as the court finds the interpretation “of
the sort that Congress would want to receive deference.”180 To determine if an
agency interpretation is of such a sort, the court will consider whether the
interpretation is of authoritative quality, is based on “substantive expertise,” and is
of “fair and considered judgment.”181 When it applies, Auer deference is, like
Chevron deference, controlling.182 Under the third type of deference, “Skidmore

Congress’s changes to the statutory language in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F)). The DOJ
concludes that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation “defeat[s] Title III’s purpose by denying
people with disabilities equal access to a service that is available to people without
disabilities.” Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 163, at *16.
177
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (“[A]dministrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of such authority.”).
178
Id. at 229.
179
Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d 323, 327 n.9 (5th Cir. 2018); see Christensen
v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (noting that, unlike an interpretation arrived at
by formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, “[i]nterpretations such as those
in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style
deference”).
180
See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–18, 2424 (2019).
181
See id. at 2416–18 (describing these three attributes as “especially important markers
for identifying when Auer deference is and is not appropriate”).
182
See id. at 2418 (“When it applies, Auer deference gives an agency significant leeway
to say what its own rules mean.”); id. at 2416 (describing the “controlling weight” of Auer
deference).
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deference” (i.e., “some deference”183), an agency’s interpretation is not controlling
but, rather, receives deference according to its power to persuade the court.184
Because the DOJ is one of the agencies in charge of ADA enforcement,185 the
DOJ’s interpretation could, on its face, be eligible for the top-tier, controlling forms
of deference. However, because the DOJ’s interpretation appeared exclusively in its
amicus curiae brief, the DOJ is not entitled to Chevron deference.186 Nor does Auer
deference apply; the DOJ is not interpreting an ambiguity within its own regulation
but, rather, an ambiguity within a statute (the ADA). Thus, the DOJ is left with
Skidmore deference, granted to it from the court according to the DOJ’s power to
persuade. 187
Under Skidmore deference, “an agency’s interpretation may merit some
deference whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader
investigations and information’ available to the agency, and given the value of
uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law
requires.”188 “The weight accorded to an administrative judgment [under Skidmore]
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”189 In short,
according to Skidmore, courts should accept an agency’s interpretation when it is
thorough, well-reasoned, and consistent with earlier interpretations.190
183

Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)
(emphasis added)).
184
See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 221 (noting that where an agency’s interpretation is in
the form of a ruling letter, it has “no claim to judicial deference under Chevron . . . but . . .
under Skidmore the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness”).
185
Id. at 226–27; see Francis M. Schneider, Manufacturing Public Accommodations
Under Title III of the ADA: The Tenth Circuit’s Expansive Interpretation of “Service
Establishment” to Include Manufacturers, 56 WASHBURN L. J. 599, 607 (2017) (“Both the
Supreme Court and circuit courts have historically deferred to the DOJ’s ADA Title III
Technical Assistance Manual to understand the meaning of an undefined word or phrase
under Title III.”); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998) (“As the agency
directed by Congress to issue implementing regulations, see 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b), to render
technical assistance explaining the responsibilities of covered individuals and institutions, §
12206(c), and to enforce Title III in court, § 12188(b), the [Department of Justice’s] views
are entitled to deference.”).
186
Silguero v. CSL Plasma, 907 F.3d 323, 327 n.9 (5th Cir. 2018). Had the DOJ’s
interpretation of the ADA’s “service establishments” terminology appeared in a regulation,
it is possible that the court would have found Chevron deference applicable to interpret the
ADA (assuming the court also found that Congress implicitly delegated authority to the
DOJ).
187
Id.
188
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234 (citations omitted).
189
Id. at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
190
See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Because there is no reason to believe that the Department’s opinion was anything but
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The Fifth Circuit did not give adequate Skidmore deference to the DOJ’s
interpretation. As noted in Section II.B, the Fifth Circuit adopted an interpretation
of “service establishment” inconsistent with the DOJ’s view. The court gave little
explanation as to why it deviated from the DOJ. Although the court acknowledged
that the DOJ’s interpretation is entitled to Skidmore deference, the court explained
Skidmore deference as deference “only to the extent that [the government’s]
interpretations have the power to persuade.”191 While this statement is correct, the
court said nothing of the factors that compose such persuasiveness (or lack of
persuasiveness) as set out in Skidmore—namely, the agency opinion’s thoroughness,
reasonableness, and consistency.192 The court’s only explanation of why it found the
DOJ’s interpretation insufficient was that the court was “unpersuaded by the DOJ’s
interpretation . . . .”193 Given that the DOJ’s interpretation was thorough, wellreasoned, and consistent with its earlier interpretations,194 the Fifth Circuit’s
conclusory explanation is inadequate under Skidmore.195 Of course, the court could
have given the DOJ’s interpretation proper deference and still have found it
unpersuasive, but without an explanation to such a finding, there is, for now, no
reason to think that the DOJ got it wrong.
B. Addressing Silguero’s Statutory Purpose Argument
As discussed in Sections III.A and III.C, the Third and Tenth Circuits both
accounted for the ADA’s statutory purpose and reached holdings consistent with it.
Where both the Third and Tenth Circuit opinions discuss the ADA’s statutory
purpose, the Fifth Circuit opinion is eerily quiet. Undoubtedly, the court is not
required to consider a statute’s purpose in the court’s statutory interpretation
analysis.196 But where a plaintiff’s argument directly implicates a statute’s policy, a
court must address the argument made, insofar as a judge has a general duty to

thoroughly considered and consistently observed, it unquestionably merits our respect.”)
(citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563
U.S. 1, 16 (2011) (holding that where agency views are “reasonable,” “consistent with the
Act,” and “reflect careful consideration,” “they consequently add force to [the court’s]
conclusion”).
191
Silguero, 907 F.3d at 327–28 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192
See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
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195
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the Supreme Court to review the Fifth Circuit’s Skidmore deference. But it was at least
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“decide the matters that come before the court.”197 To do this, the court should either
explicitly state its intention to disregard the statute’s purpose or show how the
statutory purpose is furthered by the court’s interpretation.
Indeed, in Silguero, the plaintiff raised an argument implicating the ADA’s
purpose. Silguero argued that the court should not apply ejusdem generis because
“the term ‘public accommodation’ is to be liberally construed,” in accordance with
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,198 a Supreme Court case interpreting the ADA’s statutory
purpose.199 Yet, the court did not adequately address this argument. Rather than
stating that the court would not entertain the ADA’s purpose—a response well
within the judiciary’s discretion—the court instead attempted to show how its
interpretation was compatible with the ADA’s purpose, without actually showing
how its interpretation was compatible with that purpose.200 The Fifth Circuit refuted
Silguero’s argument simply by stating that “even when a statute is to be construed
liberally, it is still not untethered from its text. Canons of interpretation help ensure
that words are not stretched past the limits Congress intended.”201
This rebuttal is inadequate. The Supreme Court has held that the “liberal
construction” (for which the plaintiff in Silguero argued) is a means “to afford
people with disabilities ‘equal access’ to the wide variety of establishments available
to the nondisabled.”202 To adequately address Silguero’s argument, the Fifth Circuit
needed to show why providing equal access to people with disabilities (via
construing plasma donation centers as service establishments) required the court to
“untether” the statute from its text or “stretch” the statutory language past what
Congress intended.203 Or, put another way, the Fifth Circuit needed to show how a
narrow construction of “service establishment” furthers the ADA’s purpose. The
Fifth Circuit’s answer to Silguero’s argument is unpersuasive insofar as it sidesteps
the precise argument that Silguero makes—one that implicates the ADA’s purpose.
The court inadequately attempted to address this argument, suggesting that the
ADA’s policy, in fact, supports the Fifth Circuit’s holding but failing to explain why
or how. The Fifth Circuit’s argument would have been more persuasive had it
explicitly and altogether disregarded the ADA’s purpose in its interpretation of the
statute’s language.
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C. Promoting Anti-Stigma Policy
This Note would be remiss to conclude without addressing compelling policy
reasons that support that courts should not narrowly construe the ADA, as the Fifth
Circuit did. If the ADA applies to blood plasma donation centers, these
establishments become unable to make broad-sweeping generalizations about those
who suffer from mental illness. Preventing blood plasma donation centers from
stigmatizing people with mental illness is a desirable end that courts should
encourage.
Stigmatizing attitudes about mental illness—like the idea that people with
mental illness are “categorically unsafe” to donate204—are, unfortunately, pervasive.
Indeed, “[s]tudies suggest that the majority of citizens in the United States and many
Western European nations have stigmatizing attitudes about mental illness.”205
While there are many shapes that these stigmas take, a relevant one is that “persons
with severe mental illness should be feared and, therefore, be kept out of most
communities.”206 This stigma is bolstered by media portrayals of people with mental
illness as “homicidal maniacs who need to be feared.”207 Those who believe this
stigma may move past a mere “cognitive and affective response” and react with
discriminatory conduct.208 Specifically, a society that stigmatizes people with mental
illness may respond with “social avoidance, where the public strives to not interact
with people with mental illness altogether.”209
Indeed, blood plasma donation centers’ policies against people with mental
illness can be understood in just this way: a form of discrimination against people
with mental illness, stemming from the prejudice that people with mental illness
ought to be feared. While perhaps not intentional, a company policy that finds people
with mental illness “categorically unsafe” to donate plasma is a policy that, if not
itself motivated by the stigma that people with mental illness need to be feared, is at
least consistent with, and in furtherance of, such a stigma. As mentioned earlier,
there is no evidence to support the claim that those with mental illness will
necessarily “put staff, other donors, or themselves at risk when donating plasma.”210
Attitudes of stigma against people with mental illness are not only misleading
but also harmful. As one article describes:
Many people with serious mental illness are challenged doubly. On one
hand, they struggle with the symptoms and disabilities that result from the
disease. On the other, they are challenged by the stereotypes and prejudice
that result from misconceptions about mental illness. As a result of both,
204

Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2019).
Patrick W. Corrigan & Amy C. Watson, Understanding the Impact of Stigma on
People with Mental Illness, 1 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 16, 16 (2002) (citations omitted).
206
Id. at 17.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 16.
209
Id. at 17.
210
Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2019).
205

2022]

“CATEGORICALLY UNSAFE” TO DONATE

467

people with mental illness are robbed of the opportunities that define a
quality life: good jobs, safe housing, satisfactory health care, and
affiliation with a diverse group of people.211
The impact of public stigma on people with mental illness cannot be understated.
In addition to the challenges that come from public stigma, some individuals
with mental illness may internalize public stigma and transform it into “selfstigma.”212 Though not all individuals with mental illness internalize social stigma
in a negative or harmful way,213 those who do may “experience diminished selfesteem/self-efficacy.”214 Because of the social stigma surrounding mental illness,
such individuals may “believe that they are less valued because of their psychiatric
disorder” or may suffer a lack of “confidence in [their] future[s].”215 Public stigma
“essentially propels those with mental illnesses to adopt an idea of themselves that
reflects a ‘stereotyped image of insanity,’ which has the effect of ‘limiting selfcontrol.’ This damaged self-understanding perpetuates deviant behavior and
prevents them from recovering, producing a self-fulfilling prophecy.”216 In short,
individuals with mental illness become locked into—and trapped by—public stigma.
As upsetting as these realities are, public stigma can be changed. The public
stigma surrounding mental illness is “diminished when members of the general
public meet persons with mental illness” who defy one’s prejudices.217 “Research
has shown an inverse relationship between having contact with a person with mental
illness and endorsing psychiatric stigma. Hence, opportunities for the public to meet
persons with severe mental illness may discount stigma.”218
By this logic, social stigma may be dismantled, in part, by not categorically
barring people with mental illness from donating blood plasma. The interaction
between the donor and the collector is meaningful in that, within it, there is the
potential for the collector to rethink his or her prejudices against people with mental
illness.219 But if individuals with mental illness are not given a chance to defy one’s
expectations and instead are labeled as “categorically unsafe,” shut out of the
opportunity from the gate, members of the public may carry on under the harmful
misconception that people with mental illness should be avoided.220 Accordingly, by
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barring individuals with mental illness access to donate blood plasma, blood plasma
donation centers perpetuate harms done to people with mental illnesses.221
Categorizing blood collection as a service will render unlawful the
discrimination against people with mental illness who wish to donate blood plasma.
And where such discrimination is unlawful, people with mental illness will be shown
the respect and dignity that they deserve. By following the precedent set by the Tenth
and Third Circuits, future courts can likewise chip away at the public stigma against
people with mental illness. Just as individuals with mental illness are not “homicidal
maniacs who need to be feared,”222 so too, are they not “categorically unsafe” to
donate. This opportunity to promote anti-stigma policy supports interpreting plasma
collection as a “service.”
V. CONCLUSION
The ADA’s ambiguous language leaves open the question of whether blood
plasma donation centers constitute Title III “service establishments.” So far, three
Circuit courts have contributed to this conversation, with the Tenth and Third
Circuits ruling that plasma donation centers are “service establishments,” and the
Fifth Circuit holding the opposite. There is substantial reason to think that the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation misses the mark. In addition to the fact that the Fifth Circuit
uses arbitrary and technical limiting principles to place blood plasma donation
centers outside of the ADA’s scope (a flaw suggested by the Third Circuit opinion),
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion is also unpersuasive insofar as it: deviates from, and pays
no deference to, the DOJ’s amicus brief; fails to adequately address the plaintiff’s
policy argument; and furthers the public stigma against people with mental illness.
While the judicial interpretation of the ADA may have failed in the past to protect
those with mental illness, courts now have an opportunity to change course. While
ultimately the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and overturn the Fifth Circuit
holding,223 until then, courts should follow the Tenth and Third Circuits’ precedent.
Future courts should find, under this precedent, that plasma donation centers are
service establishments.
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